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South African foreign policy and China: converging visions, competing 
interests, contested identities 
 
Abstract 
South Africa’s burgeoning relationship with China exposes the increasing 
complexities of its post-apartheid international relations. On one hand bilateral 
relations have deepened since 1998, due to the increasing complementarities 
with South Africa’s foreign policy priorities that emphasize developmental 
pragmatism and a Southward orientation within the broader African context. 
On the other hand this relationship emphasizes the deeper schisms within 
South African society itself, where divergent and multi-layered perspectives 
on South Africa’s post-apartheid identity and relationship with China, the 
country’s largest trading partner, remains unresolved. This article maps out 
the nature of China-South Africa relations through a thematic approach. This 
allows for nuanced consideration towards South Africa’s contemporary foreign 
policy, one that remains compressed between a combination of external and 
domestic factors.  
Keywords: South Africa, China, identity, BRICS, convergence, China-Africa, foreign 
policy analysis 
South Africa’s relationship with China is, in recent years, one of the most remarked 
aspects of its expanding international relations. It is viewed in some circles as 
emblematic of an overall re-orientation of post-apartheid South African foreign policy 
away from Western-based humanistic values to one aligned with the developmental 
pragmatism, if not the authoritarian agenda, of the strongest member of the BRICS 
configuration.1 While these critical judgments are principally derived from an 
assessment of South Africa’s conduct as a two-term non-permanent member of the 
UN Security Council and on ‘hot button’ issues like the Dalai Lama, the actual 
content of South African ties with China are much more complex and nuanced than 
this simplistic reading suggests. In fact, it is a relationship that finds a growing 
measure of convergence in its global outlook and developmental concerns while 
experiencing direct competition in commercial areas as well as generating 
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controversy on specific issues within South African society. This complex 
perspective is shaping an elite vision of a new South African identity that is framed in 
terms of its Southward orientation within the broader African context that increasingly 
looks to China for support to meet its own foreign policy agenda and development 
aspirations. 
Assessing the impact of relations with China on South Africa is part of a larger 
debate on how the country’s foreign policy identity is evolving in the post-apartheid 
period. Scholarship recognises that foreign policy plays a foundational role in the 
creation of national identity through its articulation and implementation of policies on 
sovereignty, interests and national values that it promotes internationally (Wallace, 
1991, p.65; Weldes, 1996, p.303). Elite articulation of national interests provides the 
structure for specific foreign policy action and concurrently reflects the image and 
identity of a given country in the international system while counter-vailing domestic 
audiences contest these perspectives based on their particularistic interests and 
understanding of national identity (Bischoff, 2003, pp. 189-190).  
An examination of South Africa’s foreign policy and its gradual strategic re-alignment 
towards China highlights these features. On the one hand, this ‘pivot’ to China is an 
expression of South Africa’s development needs and the strengthening of its identity 
as ‘Africa’s representative’ in global events as well as fortifying its position within the 
Global South (Alden and Schoeman, 2013). Aligning more closely with the world’s 
leading emerging power, with its considerable financial resources and capacities, 
matches well with South Africa’s own development ambitions at home and in Africa. 
On the other hand, there is on-going unease in some South African circles with the 
nature and depth of these ties. Issues ranging from economic competition with South 
African businesses to public concern over the opaque nature of diplomatic relations 
converge to a position that is generally at odds with the Zuma administration’s 
foreign policy orientation towards China.  These differing perspectives resonate with 
divergent and multi-layered perspectives on South Africa’s post-apartheid identity, a 
debate that remains unresolved.  
Past as prologue: historical review 
Contemporary relations between South Africa and China have roots that stretch back 
to the late nineteenth century when Chinese labourers were brought in to work on 
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the gold mines and formed the basis for the first settled Chinese community in South 
Africa. 
With the election of the National Party in 1948, the Afrikaner led National Party 
government instituted a more systemised and comprehensive racial policy towards 
‘non-whites’ in the country. The small Chinese community in South Africa found itself 
subject to the myriad of racist legislation implemented gradually under apartheid, 
including the group areas act and separate education (Yapp and Man, 1996). South 
Africa’s growing international isolation factored into Prime Minister PW Botha 
expansion of formal diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (ROC) in 1980, 
creating regular military-to-military links with Taipei as well as encouraging stronger 
economic ties (Geldenhuys. 1994, p.281). On the former, the cooperation on 
research into nuclear power featured through a series of high level exchanges and 
agreements but was curtailed after 1987 (Tseng, 2006, pp.214-215). Regarding 
strengthening economic engagement between South Africa and ROC, this included 
providing incentives for entrepreneurs to set up businesses in the ‘bantustans’, 
efforts that attracted a growing tide of Taiwanese investment (Pickles and Woods, 
1989). Two-way trade grew enormously over the next few decades, from US$30 
million in 1979 to US$5.8 billion in 1995 (Alden, 2001, p.121). 
During this same period, the divisive politics of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 
1960s was manifested as support for the African National Congress (ANC) by 
Moscow and Beijing’s support for a rival liberation movement, the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC).  After discussions with Mao Zedong, China had invited several 
UmKhonto we Sizwe members for military training, though as divisions in the 
international socialist movement began to manifest, this programme was later 
abandoned (Ellis, 2013, p.28). The Sino-Soviet dispute brought about the severance 
of ties between the South African Communist Party (SACP) and Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), and the relationship became ‘very bad’ (Pahad, personal interview, 
2014). However, following a meeting in Lusaka between Premier Zhao Ziyang and 
OR Tambo in 1982 the climate changed sufficiently to allow for the restoration of 
party-to-party relations with regularised contact and even limited Chinese financial 
assistance to the SACP (Maloka, 2002, p.55). 
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With the end of white minority rule and the onset of democratic elections in April 
1994, the expectation was that the ANC-dominated government of national unity 
would switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to the Peoples’ Republic of China as a 
matter of course (Alden, 2001, pp.119-135). Inexplicably, this did not occur; indeed 
the Mandela government gave assurances that formal ties with Taipei would 
continue indefinitely in 1995. At the same time, his government embarked on a 
quixotic campaign to convince Beijing of the merits of ‘dual recognition’ (Alden, 2001, 
pp.129-131). Competing promises of trade, aid and investment by Taipei, countered 
by Beijing, ensued. Subsequently, it was revealed that during his July 1993 visit to 
the island, Mandela made a personal appeal to Taiwan’s leader, Lee Teng-hui, for 
financial support to the cash-strapped ANC to fight the upcoming elections, resulting 
in a contribution of US$10 million (followed by an additional request for US$5 million) 
(Viljoen, 2010, p.165).  
Spurred on by divisions within the Department of Foreign Affairs, elements in the 
ANC governing alliance, business and academic interests lined up on different sides 
to argue the case for or against recognition. Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo’s trip to 
Beijing in March 1996 (Singh, 1997), which Chinese government expected would 
signal the switch in diplomatic ties but rather was intended on the South African side 
to promote the notion of ‘dual recognition’, produced a swift reaction. At the 
delegation’s final meeting with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, his terse declaration 
that ‘the apartheid government made more effort to recognise China than you have’, 
signalled the beginning of a harder line (Anonymous, personal interview, 2014). 
From 1996 onwards, South African diplomats were reporting back to Pretoria that 
South Africa’s consulate status there might be negatively affected by the return of 
Hong Kong to China in 1997 while at home questions were being raised as to 
Taiwan’s commitment to support its much publicised investment plans in the Eastern 
Cape (Botha and Dietrichsen, 2010, p.183). In the end, Mandela’s surprise decision 
to grant official recognition to Beijing, made in November 1996, gave Taiwan thirteen 
months’ transition before the switch and allowed incoming President Thabo Mbeki to 
forge a new relationship with China unencumbered by the legacies of the recent 
past. 
Diplomacy and bilateral ties  
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The opening of formal diplomatic ties in January 1998 was marked by an escalating 
series of official declarations highlighting the intensification of bilateral cooperation 
with only limited results in realizing these ambitions. The Pretoria Declaration2  was 
announced during an official visit by President Jiang Zemin in April 2000 (Shelton, 
2008, p.260). The focus of the declaration was on the establishment of a bi-national 
commission with a more generalized commitment to improve the conditions for 
mutual economic benefit in the form of expanding trade and investment, especially in 
the area of natural resources, mining and manufacturing (Huajie, 2000, p.2). On 
Africa, both countries agreed to collaborate on improving continental security and 
development while promoting a more equitable international order based on non-
intervention and mutual interests. 
Formal relations evolved quickly from the Pretoria Declaration, with the first bi-
national commission meeting in December 2001 followed by the elevation of ties at 
the second bi-national commission in June 2004 to that of a Strategic Partnership 
(Department for International Relations and Cooperation, 2004). As part of the 
Strategic Partnership, South Africa decided to grant China ‘market status’ – an 
important step that narrowed the parameters to pursue certain kinds of trade 
disputes in terms of World Trade Organization (WTO) criteria – and that coincided 
with the opening of negotiations for a free trade agreement with the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). The two sides committed themselves to ‘intensifying’ 
interaction and consultation between their foreign ministries, as well as taking steps 
to promote agricultural exports and education. 
However, President Thabo Mbeki’s diplomatic focus during this time was directed 
towards a grand strategy of continental initiatives, starting with the articulation of the 
African renaissance in 1998 and the New African Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) whose central aim was to strengthen aid and investment ties 
with the G8 countries. As a result, the position of China was relatively neglected by 
Pretoria. This was despite the launching of China’s Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2000 and a growing Chinese economic 
presence in the rest of the continent. The G8-Africa Summit held in Edinburgh in 
2005, where China’s invitation to participate only came at the last minute, 
underscored the degree to which the global focus on China-Africa relations remained 
obscured. 
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During this time, the Mbeki presidency maintained a largely cordial if not especially 
close relationship with China. This reflected in part divisions within the Office of the 
Presidency and the South African government more generally between those who 
enthusiastically supported the relationship and those more suspicious of Chinese 
intentions on the continent (Anonymous, personal interview, 2007a). Mbeki, while 
supportive of the FOCAC process (Pahad, personal interview, 2014), nonetheless 
articulated his own concerns about China in a widely publicized speech in the 
aftermath of the successful FOCAC III (Davies, 2008; BBC News, 2006). In his 
address to the South African Students Congress in December 2006, Mbeki 
cautioned that ‘in its relationship with China, Africa must guard against merely 
becoming a supplier of raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods’ (Mail and 
Guardian, 2006). Hu Jintao’s hastily organized visit in February 2007, in which the 
Chinese president gave what amounted to a pointed rebuttal of Mbeki’s commentary. 
highlighted the anxieties and strengths in the relationship at the time:  
It is natural that new issues and new challenges may arise. Yet, compared 
with the larger interests of China-Africa cooperation, these issues, which 
occur in the course of advance, can surely be resolved through friendly 
consultation and deepened cooperation. China takes seriously the concerns 
about the imbalance in the structure of China-Africa trade and the scope of 
Chinese investment.3  
In regional terms, South African involvement in continental peace and security issues 
as well as the growing commercial competition between South African and Chinese 
companies were complicating factors in bilateral ties (Corkin and Burke, 2008, p.45). 
Moreover, key African states, which were developing closer ties with Beijing – 
notably Zimbabwe, Sudan and to a lesser degree Angola - had problematic 
relationships with Mbeki’s government, and this introduced tensions in Pretoria. This 
was most evident in the case of Darfur, where Beijing’s obdurate defence of 
Khartoum in the early 2000s differed from the South African approach (Le Pere, 
2008, p.16). This disquiet was exacerbated by the experience of South African 
businesses both at home and on the continent, as these businesses began to 
complain about losing contracts and market share to Chinese interests in Africa.4 
Warnings were even sounded by leading South African ‘friends of China’, as to the 
negative impact that Chinese migration would eventually have on diplomatic ties 
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(Botha, 2004, pp.63-64). With regard to Zimbabwe, South African officials were 
suspicious of China’s growing involvement in an economy that was still dominated by 
South African interests (Anonymous, personal interview, 2007b). The nadir in 
relations came with the disclosure of Chinese armament shipments to Zimbabwe in 
April 2008 at the height of sensitive elections in that country, bringing a hail of 
criticism from South African and Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
leaders. 
Within a few months however, there was a shift towards closer cooperation on 
Zimbabwe between Beijing and Pretoria. According to a senior Chinese official, 
active coordination between top Chinese and South African officials over the 
Zimbabwe issue in the aftermath of the G8 Summit held in Japan in June 2008 
helped bring Robert Mugabe to the negotiating table with rival Morgan Tsvangirai. 
Specifically, Britain and the US publically repudiated Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ 
towards Zimbabwe at the G8 Summit and introduced a resolution at the UN Security 
Council aimed at strengthening sanctions against Mugabe’s government. Chinese 
and South African officials, working together (as South Africa was a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council at that time) arrived at an approach that saw Beijing 
veto the resolution in New York but privately make it clear to Mugabe that it would 
not block future resolutions (Anonymous Chinese diplomat, personal interview, 
2008). Hemmed in, the Zanu-PF leader went on to sign the Global Peace Agreement 
with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change under the auspices of South 
African-led mediation.  
By 2009, following the abrupt ousting of Mbeki from the ANC leadership in 
December 2007 and his subsequent replacement as South African president by 
Kgalema Motlanthe in 2008, Beijing was anxious to ‘upgrade’ the relationship. On 
the South African side, the implications of the global financial crisis and China’s 
ability to weather it began to sink in5, with Jacob Zuma’s presidential campaign 
touting the lessons for South Africa from adopting an Asian-style ‘development state’ 
approach. Early insights into the incoming Zuma administration’s aspirations for the 
relationship can be gleaned from a presentation on South Africa’s future economic 
relations with China made in November 2009 by Minister of Economic Development, 
Ebrahim Patel.  He framed ties with China in terms of a set of domestic economic 
priorities, including the need for Chinese policies towards South Africa (and the 
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continent as a whole) that would meet its needs for large-scale infrastructure 
development and employment creation.  Fundamentally, he called for efforts to 
ensure that the current structure of trade, whereby South Africa was a supplier of 
raw materials and Europe and North America were exporters of manufactured 
goods, was not replicated with China (Patel, 2009, p.13). 
During President Zuma’s first state visit to China in August 2010, China and South 
Africa announced a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, which formally elevated 
bilateral ties from the previous ‘Strategic Partnership’. The Beijing Declaration, as it 
became known, signed by both presidents during the ‘upgrade’ in relations (Davies, 
2008), expressed the desire to deepen and strengthen cooperation and exchanges 
between the two countries through a set of concrete measures. With regard to 
political and regional affairs, the two countries committed to enhancing joint efforts in 
the global arena, such as in the United Nations and FOCAC, and the presidents 
agreed to maintain frequent contact in order to enhance mutual understanding of and 
support for each other's positions and interests (Stratsis Incite, 2010). Specifically, 
the declaration outlined 38 bilateral cooperation agreements, ranging from political 
dialogues to trade and investment to mineral exploration and agriculture, most of 
which were identical to or elaborations of the areas identified in the strategic 
cooperation agreement six years beforehand (Alden and Wu 2014, p.10). Behind the 
decision to push forward in formal diplomatic relations from that of a strategic 
partnership and later a comprehensive strategic partnership was the recognition of 
their shared outlooks in international affairs underpinned by economic interests and 
a concomitant desire by Beijing to strengthen coordination and planning between the 
two countries (Anonymous, personal interview, 2013).  
The establishment of a Joint Inter-Ministerial Working Group (JIMWG) on China-
South Africa Cooperation at the meeting in Beijing in 2010 was aimed, according to 
the South African Foreign Minister, to ‘identify and work through any obstacles to the 
implementation of our bilateral commitments’ (Republic of South Africa, 2010). Zuma 
appointed five Cabinet Ministers to serve on the South African. The new 
arrangement envisaged bi-annual meetings of deputy president/prime minister and 
annual meetings at ministerial levels, coupled with more regularised contact between 
South African officials and Chinese diplomats, which would build trust and facilitate 
better cooperation. The two countries formally ratified the JIMWG only in March 2013 
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(see below). The practical implementation of this initiative remained problematic, 
however, with South African officials sometimes unable to attend or fully participate 
in joint events. This led one senior Chinese diplomat to suggest that the excessive 
workload of civil servants was contributing to occasional breaches in protocol by the 
South Africans (Centre for Chinese Studies 2007, p.104). Despite this issue, DIRCO 
officials and their counterparts in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs met annually 
between 2008 and 2013 (Business Day, 2013). 
During the same Zuma visit to China (accompanied by 370 representatives from the 
South African business community), South African and Chinese companies signed 
more than a dozen agreements covering investments in railway, power transmission 
construction, mining, insurance, telecoms and nuclear power. Most importantly, his 
trip was the last of a series of visits to the other BRIC countries that gave Zuma an 
opportunity to personally make the case for inclusion in the BRICs grouping, an 
initiative that was to pay dividends in late 2010 (see next section) (Stuenkel, 2013, p. 
311). And yet later, at the 2012 FOCAC ministerial, international media coverage of 
the event focused on Zuma’s comment that China-Africa relations were 
‘unsustainable’ as they stood, reflecting not a lack of confidence in the ties but rather 
a shared view with Beijing that the contemporary economic foundation of the 
relationship needed to shift away from the pattern of unequal exchange if it was to 
thrive (The Presidency: the Republic of South Africa, 2012). 
Though only a minor feature of bilateral ties, military-to-military relations have also 
followed the pattern of gradual upgrading during the decade and a half of official 
diplomatic ties. The first meeting of the China-South Africa defence committee, a 
forum created in 2000 with the Pretoria Declaration, was held in April 2003 and it 
was only a year later that a formal agreement was signed allowing for training of 
South African soldiers and a donation of electronic equipment to the SANDF (Ntuli, 
2003). By 2010, the fourth China-South Africa defence committee meeting in 
November expanded security cooperation towards the continent. Under Zuma, 
acknowledgement of China’s expanded role in peacekeeping and supportive position 
on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and at the African Union (AU) has 
resulted in greater enthusiasm in military circles for cooperation. South African 
Major-General Ntakaleleni Sigudu declared his appreciation of the Peoples 
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Liberation Army’s (PLA) contribution to achieving ‘the AU’s objectives of building its 
own strong, effective and efficient peacekeeping capability’ and endorsed the desire 
for closer coordination between the two militaries in bringing stability to the continent 
(Radebe, 2013). 
In parallel, since the signing of the Beijing Declaration in 2000, commercial 
transactions between South Africa’s armaments manufacturer, Denel, and the 
Chinese military have increased. The PLA has taken delivery of South African 
technologies related to anti-aircraft gun ammunition, anti-tank guided missiles and 
air-to-air missiles while South Africa's aerospace industry has also established 
strong links in China, such as in developing unmanned aerial vehicle programmes 
(Grevatt, 2010). Chinese pilots also received flight training from ex-South African air 
force and navy personnel in Mafikeng starting in 2010. 6  
Nevertheless, while there has been an increased exchange of military personnel at 
this stage there is little trade in military goods between the two countries, as South 
Africa manufactures much of its own military equipment while continuing to source 
the remainder from the European Union (Centre for Chinese Studies, 2007, p.111). 
Indeed, despite opening an office in Cape Town in the late 1990s, the Chinese 
industrial equivalent to Denel has been notably unsuccessful in penetrating the 
South African market.  
Party to party relations, on the other hand, thrived throughout this period. The SACP 
invited the CCP to the first party congress held in South Africa since its unbanning 
and return from exile and, along with the ANC, maintained close ties thereafter 
(Pahad, personal interview, 2014). SACP Secretary General, Blade Nzimande, 
visited President Jiang Zemin in Beijing in November 1998 and they launched a 
mutual consultative mechanism, the ‘first of its kind’ for the CCP according to some 
sources (Le Pere and Shelton, 2007, p.163). This relationship, manifested through 
annual exchanges and participation in party conferences, became a channel for 
discussion of international issues. In 2010, the ANC leadership signed an agreement 
to send the all members of its National Executive Committee to Beijing for three 
weeks training in management and organizational skills.7  This move reflects a 
broader interest on the part of the ANC in learning from the Chinese experience, 
which resulted in a longstanding programme to send government officials from 
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various ministries for training with their counterpart ministries in China (Ubuntu 
Radio, 2015). 
Finally, it should be recognized that the depth of diplomatic ties between South 
Africa and China went beyond the central state to include provincial links (Chen and 
Jian, 2009). South African provinces like Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western 
Cape partnered with Chinese provinces and cities. In the course of interaction, for 
instance, the Gauteng Economic Development Agency conducted eight missions to 
China between 1998 and 2002 as well as opening a ‘China desk’ to manage ties 
(Cornelissen, 2006, p.131). Indeed, the incoming ANC premier of Gauteng, 
addressing a gathering of leading businessmen in May 2014, expressed his 
administration’s specific desire to encourage more Chinese FDI into the province 
(Bizos, personal interview, 2014). 
Multilateral ties – UNSC, FOCAC, BRICS and G20 
In 2009, at a media briefing, previous Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma 
summed up the positive attitude felt within South African circles regarding their 
position vis-à-vis China in multilateral affairs (Republic of South Africa, 2009): 
We are strategic partners and we co-operate in a whole range of areas – the 
economic level in terms of promoting trade and investments between our two 
countries; people to people and cultural exchanges; science and technology; 
and a whole range of other areas. We…co-operate in the multilateral arena – 
China has been very supportive of our engagement in Africa in peace and 
security areas besides Africa-China co-operation so we value and think our 
relations are very important…’  
Echoing this sentiment in 2012, outgoing Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed the 
view that China and South Africa share common interests in many international 
contexts, and China hoped to co-operate with South Africa in the UN, G20, BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and other international forums to 
increase the collective voice of developing countries and propel the international 
political and economic order toward a more fair and reasonable direction (People’s 
Daily Online, 2012). Indeed, the strengthening of South Africa-China cooperation on 
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global affairs is a hallmark of the relationship. These positive expressions of mutual 
support were given concrete meaning through four particular multilateral forums - the 
UNSC, FOCAC, BRICS and the G20. 
 
During South Africa’s first tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council (2007-2009), the shared perspective on many global issues became more 
evident in its conduct and voting behavior. Certainly the positions it adopted on 
emotive issues like Myanmar and sanctions were characterized by South African and 
foreign critics as a sign of growing proximity of interests with China (Mail & Guardian, 
2007). This was hotly denied by Pretoria, which argued that it ‘was not a vote against 
the people of Myanmar’ and it would not endorse isolating the military regime 
through sanctions (a stance that was arguably vindicated when the severest critics – 
the US and the European Union – shifted their own policies a few years later to one 
of ‘constructive engagement’) (Republic of South Africa, 2007). The case of 
Zimbabwe and sanctions is another example of where South Africa worked 
cooperatively with China to block Western-inspired sanctions (see above). Of 
particular significance from a South African perspective was the experience of 
working with China on African security, which for one diplomat involved with the 
South African mission underscored the willingness of the Chinese to genuinely seek 
out, consult and integrate South African (and African) views in formulating UN 
Security Council positions (Anonymous South African diplomat, personal interview, 
2010). In its more recent tenure as a non-permanent member (2011-2013), the 
South African support for UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya, which paved the way for 
NATO-led ‘regime change’, corresponded with a Chinese abstention that at least in 
part reflected consultations with African and Arab regional bodies, even if the action 
went against Beijing’s preferred position (Swaine 2012, p.6). Following a heated 
national exchange demonizing the decision, Pretoria thereafter took a series of 
positions more consciously aligned to BRICS approaches in the UNSC (Alden and 
Schoeman, 2013). 
With regard to FOCAC, South African involvement has reflected a desire to ensure 
that African – or at least South African – perspectives were incorporated in the 
ministerial meetings. South African officials are regularly lauded by Chinese officials 
as being the most active of delegates amongst the African ambassadors based in 
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Beijing. Over the years, this activism has translated into the incorporation of 
measures calling for beneficiation as a feature of Chinese investments in the 
resource sector, improved terms of trade and greater adherence by Chinese firms to 
environmental and labour standards implemented at the bilateral level. South Africa’s 
hosting of FOCAC VI on 4-5 December 2015 – the first FOCAC summit on African 
soil after apparent resistance by Beijing – provided a further opportunity for Pretoria 
(who co-chairs until 2018) to make its influence felt.  
South Africa’s ascension to the BRICS grouping in late 2010 followed an intensive 
lobbying campaign with its members and, reportedly, came against the backdrop of 
China’s unsuccessful attempts to join the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) 
grouping (Games, 2013, p.383). The Zuma presidency picked up the idea of a 
BRICS Development Bank, an Indian initiative endorsed by the BRICS Summit in 
New Delhi in 2012, and made it a centre piece of its hosting of the Durban Summit in 
2013 (Alden and Schoeman, 2013). While agreement was reached on some aspects 
of the BRICS New Development Bank, notably the capital requirements of members 
and its headquarters in Shanghai (a major disappointment for South African officials, 
even with a decision to set up a regional office in South Africa), a fuller rendering of 
its activities (most likely infrastructure development) remained mired in negotiations 
at the time of the Durban Summit (Wood, 2014). Regarding BRICS and global 
issues, as the various summit declarations 8 highlighted, the two governments 
shared similar positions on the need for example to ‘democratise’ international 
institutions and the necessity of an approach to climate change which took into 
account developing countries, interests. On controversial foreign policy issues like 
Libya (or later Crimea), while there was no conformity of position expected, 
disagreements were to be expressed behind closed doors and not for the world to 
see so as to retain the image of BRICS unity. 9  
Trade and investment  
The momentum building behind more than a decade and a half of diplomatic 
relations is producing closer, more pragmatic economic ties. Two-way trade has 
accelerated since 2008, from R121 billion to R270 billion in 2013 (including a 32% 
jump from the 2012 figure of R205 billion), thereby making China the country’s 
largest global trading partner (Republic of South Africa, 2014b; Ensor, 2014). 
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Reinforcing this trend are various factors such as South Africa’s own changing 
foreign policy approach which has elevated the importance of economic links, as 
reflected by President Zuma’s ‘all-embracing’ attitude towards economic ties with 
China while other aspects such as participation in peacekeeping have decreased 
(Grant-Makokera, 2015, p.2). On a global level, Pretoria’s formal recognition of 
China’s market economy status in the aftermath of Beijing’s decision to join the 
WTO, led to the upgrading of its strategic partnership in 2004 (Nkoana-Mashabane, 
2013, p.4). Two-way trade also has flourished partially due to the contraction of 
global trade following the 2008 financial crisis. In the first half of 2009 it was 
calculated that there had been a 32.8% drop in imports from major import 
economies, such as the EU and US (International Trade Centre, 2009, p.4). In this 
context China became the largest bilateral trading partner of both South Africa and 
the region – and as noted above is even regarded to have supported South Africa in 
weathering the global economic crisis. 10  
Investment on the other hand forms a more modest portion of economic relations. 
South African Reserve Bank data reveals11 that China was a modest source of FDI 
for South Africa from 1997–2010 when compared to countries like the United 
Kingdom, United States and Germany – with the exception of 2008, when it was the 
top source (Sandrey 2013, p.3; Meibo and Ren 2013, p.10). There were hopes of the 
expansion of economic links when the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) took a 20% stake ($5.5 billion) in South Africa’s Standard Bank in 2008 – 
said to be one of the largest equity investments into the country (The Economist, 
2014; Alden and Wu, 2014, p.21). Yet the deal can be construed as not being 
‘employment-generating’ FDI; moreover expectations of the deal generating high 
revenue have thus far proved to be inflated (Alden and Wu, 2014, p.21; Africa 
Confidential, 2010, p.2).  
According to Shelton and Kabemba (2012, p.77), up until 2012 South African firms 
invested approximately R8.48 billion ($800 million at 2010 rates) in China, mostly in 
the mining sector (iron ore, zinc, coal and precious metals), the food and beverage 
industry, and telecommunications and media. The South African presence in China 
includes the media conglomerate, Naspers and its majority stake in China’s largest 
Internet company, Tencent (Boehler 2014). Multinational corporations such as SAB-
Miller (beverages) and Anglo-American (mining) whose capital base and 
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management structure was originally South African but are now listed internationally, 
are also significant investors.   
The investment front also demonstrates the extent to which the recipient milieu is in 
fact impacting Chinese interests. Although South Africa is a resource-rich country, it 
is viewed in industry terms as maturing, so opportunities for outside investors are 
limited (Bezuidenhout, personal interview, 2014). Moreover, its regulatory 
environment is considerably more complex than that of other African countries, and 
is reasonably well enforced. Coupled to this is a rigid labour market and the strong 
position of trade unions, which make life difficult for the Chinese (as with their 
Taiwanese predecessors) operating textile factories for example (Mail & Guardian, 
2013). Mbeki’s promotion of black economic empowerment (BEE), which requires 
businesses to provide company assets to black South Africans, also served to inhibit 
some investors. For novice Chinese entrepreneurs, these factors have presented 
obstacles that have taken some time to overcome.  
These factors are evident in the cautious approach adopted by Chinese companies 
to investing in the South African mining sector where China seeks to enter into joint 
ventures 12 or arrangements with suppliers in South Africa with the aim of obtaining 
long-term, stable sources of resources (Shelton and Kabemba, 2012, p.79). Coupled 
with China’s engagement is the ANC’s interest in opening up the South African 
mining sector to new foreign investors like China and Russia, according to an ex-DTI 
official, to break the dominance of long-established mining companies whose 
practices remained largely framed by the narrow extractive approaches of the past 
(Qobo, personal interview, 2014). 
While the modalities of Chinese investors remain much the same, there have been 
signals of diversification since the stabilisation of the severe market turbulence of 
2009. This was partly encouraged by Zuma’s foreign policy strategy, involving a 
more conscious leveraging of Chinese financial resources in pursuit of South Africa’s 
industrialisation (such as the announcement of a multi-billion dollar National 
Infrastructure Plan in infrastructure in 2012) and African Agenda (Republic of South 
Africa, 2014a). The result seems to be a surge in Chinese capital investment into 
South Africa, according to one report (Ensor, 2014), which totalled at R13.33 billion 
by 2014. 
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New areas of investment include the acquisition of media (China’s StarTimes 
acquired the struggling pay-tv operator, TopTV), vineyard (Val de Vie estate) and 
even a prospective multi-million dollar mixed-use residential, retail and light-industry 
facility east of Johannesburg by Shanghai Zendai Property (Ferreira, 2014; Shih, 
2014). Moreover, Chinese financing for local beneficiation through a steel plant in 
Phalaborwa anticipates a new trend aimed at employment generating investment for 
South Africans, 13 and is also echoed in discussions for the revival of the Coega 
Industrial Development Zone in East London that could generate 4600 jobs 
(Fabricius, 2014; Herald Live, 2014). Importantly, many of these developments are 
still unfolding and thus their full impact remains undetermined.  
Diplomacy – though little concrete action – took aim at outstanding areas of 
difference, such as the continued trade deficit and the structure of trade (Gonzalez-
Nuñez, 2010). China imports minimally value-added products (such as minerals and 
agricultural products) from South Africa, while South Africa mainly imports Chinese 
manufactured products (such as clothing, data processing machines, bull dozers and 
motor vehicles). 14 Notably since the 2010 Beijing Declaration, both countries 
indicated commitment to ensure the inclusion of more value-added products in South 
Africa’s exports to China (DTI, 2012).  
During President Xi Jinping’s state visit to South Africa in March 2013, both sides 
finally signed the Terms of Reference for a JIMWG and a Technical Committee on 
Trade Statistics with the aim of coordinating and ensuring implementation of major 
projects, solving challenges related to such projects and supporting bilateral trade 
through practical cooperation 15  – an important issue being the inconsistencies in 
(calculations of) economic data from both sides (Gelb 2010, p.6; Sandrey, Mpitsa, 
Vermaak and De Beer, 2013, p.5). China also pledged R94 billion in trade and 
investment to South Africa during Xi’s second state visit on 3 December 2015.  
Whilst the intention to address South Africa’s economic concerns is clear, it is not yet 
commensurate to the rapid rate of growth in economic links.   
More than any other dimension of the bilateral economic relationship, the experience 
of South African manufacturing firms confronted with Chinese competition has 
become illustrative of some of the problems between the two countries (Munemo, 
2013, p.305; Alden and Wu, 2014, p.22). A sector that in 1995 employed 230 000 
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South Africans and was the country’s sixth largest exporter, suffered between 75 000 
and 85 000 job losses through direct competition with Chinese imports (Shelton & 
Kabemba, 2012, p.110). The continuing job losses to Chinese imports in the 
manufacturing sector has made the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
(COSATU) one of China’s most vocal critics (Shelton & Kabemba, 2012, pp.111-
112). While some unionists within COSATU are more sanguine about the Chinese 
impact (Masuku, personal interview, 2013), noting more positive impacts emerging 
over the long term from deepening economic engagement with China, especially in 
terms of learning and technology transfer (thus reflecting changes within the union’s 
leadership). The South African government’s public concern over the adverse impact 
on manufacturing has been tempered by privately held beliefs that sectors such as 
textiles are not sustainable in a globalising trade environment. 16  
 
Moreover, both countries compete commercially in Africa. In fact South Africa ranks 
as Africa’s biggest investor, and not China as popularly perceived (Defence Web, 
2010). In recognition of the need for transport infrastructure in Africa, South African 
companies such as Grindrod have ventured into rail infrastructure investment in 
Africa; meanwhile Chinese firms have also signed deals to undertake railway 
construction (Munshi, 2014; Wildau, 2015). There is, however, the possibility that 
Chinese FDI in South Africa is producing impacts that may offset these commercial 
losses. For instance the use of South Africa as a site for FAW’s (motor 
manufacturer) auto assembly has produced a market for its vehicles and a platform 
for exports into other regions in Africa that could eventually fulfil many of South 
Africa’s stated ambitions to harness employment through FDI (Alden and Wu, 2014, 
p.20). Importantly, the trade front is a reminder that China has other crucial trading 
partners on the continent; in 2012 its main African trading partners were South Africa 
(30%), Angola (19%) and Nigeria, Egypt and Libya (all at 5%) (Tralac, 2013). This 
leads Sandrey et al (2013, p.4) to note that ‘South Africa is not as important to China 
as the converse of China to South Africa’.  
 
Finally, the recent ‘normalisation’ of China’s economy (Michelson, 2015; Kilpatrick, 
2015) prompts South Africa to assess the burgeoning relationship between the 
diplomatic and economic fronts in terms of Zuma’s stated goals to prioritise domestic 
industrialisation as both domestic and foreign policy driver. There are signs of such 
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recognition and possible expanding links with other parts of Asia, as reflected by 
South Africa’s Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa’s visit to Japan in August 2015 to 
promote trade and investment and consolidate the African agenda by strengthening 
the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) partnership, 
just a month after his state visit to China to discuss issues such as financial 
cooperation, the BRICS New Development Bank and South Africa’s hosting FOCAC 
VI (Ramaphosa, 2015; RDM News Wire, 2015).  
State-society relations 
Public engagement is increasingly important in China-South Africa relations. Both 
countries are generally taking more interest in public diplomacy (albeit China to a 
larger degree) (Alden and Wu, 2014, pp.23-24). With respect to bilateral relations, 
policymakers recognise the need to increase people-to-people engagement as 
reflected by the remarks by China’s ambassador to South Africa, Tian Xuejun 
(2012): 
The Chinese government has attached great importance to people-to-people 
and cultural exchanges between China and Africa, actively helped Chinese 
and African people to meet with each other, know each other, and become 
friends with each other, so that everyone would advocate, participate in and 
promote China-Africa relations  
As China’s communication with foreign publics increases, so will the public’s reaction 
to Chinese engagement become more assertive. Howard French (2014) sees that 
Africa’s vibrant advocacy and civil society groups are the very stakeholders that will 
challenge formal representations of the relationship as ‘win-win’. Additionally the 
Chinese community in South Africa - reported as the largest in Africa, estimated to 
stand at more than 350 000 in 2012 (although official numbers are difficult to 
determine) - is projected to increase in the coming decades (Park and Alden, 2013).  
 
Public participation in China-South Africa relations is both complex and less 
developed than the formal economic and political links. It is important to assess 
different levels of interaction (which are not, however, mutually exclusive) that 
include the interaction between Chinese and South African publics, China’s 
engagement with its ‘own public’ and the nature of South African government-public 
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interaction. It is such elements that together, complicate the government-public 
nexus in bilateral relations - and thus require further interpretation.   
 
China–South Africa ties are not merely high-level engagements driven by elite 
interests. There are also informal and subtle spaces, described by Park and Alden 
(2013) as the ‘downstairs’ dimension, where un-orchestrated engagements 
potentially shape the agenda of the more formal relationship. In particular the links 
and understanding between Chinese and South African publics remain limited and 
snapshots of emotive commentary reflect this (Wu, 2013). For example, following the 
2012 public outrage over the 455 rhinos that had been killed illegally for their horns 
in South Africa, the journalist Julian Rademeyer commented ‘there’s this stereotype 
being sold in South Africa of these evil, Fu Manchu Asians trying to kill our wildlife’ 
(Powell, 2012). The popularised term ‘Fong Kong’ has also become part of the South 
African lexicon, denoting goods that are cheap imitations and cannot be trusted 
(McNamee, Mills, Manoeli, Mulaudzi, Doran and Chen, 2012, p.24). This has been 
linked to goods originating from China. The phrase even became the title of a 
popular kwaito (local music genre) hit in 2010, reflecting the transforming relations 
between the continent and China (Sosibo, 2010). The long-standing perception of 
inferior quality is in turn impacting China’s business presence in South Africa  
(Zhigang and Jiabao, 2014, p.19; Lianxing, 2014, p.21) Linked to this is the notion 
that in a country where there is nearly 25% unemployment, ‘Chinese workers are 
increasingly taking jobs away from unemployed South Africans’ (Slabbert, 2012). 
South African civil society is also outspokenly critical when Chinese actors have 
acted in ways that diverge from the interests of local actors. For instance is the 
important role of South African civil society in the 2008 campaign to prevent a 
Chinese vessel, the An Yue Jiang, from offloading weapons destined for Zimbabwe’s 
defence force (Fritz, 2009). 
Apart from events that generate emotive responses 17, are also perceptions that are 
deep-seated and linked to specific interests. This was highlighted in a 2010 
Afrobarometer perceptions study (Gadzala and Hanusch, 2010, p.2-3) that noted 
amid contrary views of China as a welcomed partner or an exploiter of the continent, 
the lesser-known motivations and the reasons behind such perceptions (that is, the 
fact that China’s engagement in Africa has produced both economic winners and 
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losers), which can affect relations. In terms of the South African business reaction to 
China’s economic engagements, there are generally more positive views of China in 
the primary materials sector (agriculture and mining) than in manufacturing, where 
competition is most acute; the service sector manifests mixed feelings (due to 
partnering with local financial services and Chinese firms competing directly with 
South Africa on the continent). 18 A 2013 online questionnaire on China’s business 
practices in Africa by the Ethics Institute of South Africa (2014) similarly found that 
the majority of the 1 056 respondents (from South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya) were 
concerned about the business impact of China on the continent – with South African 
respondents being the most concerned (Louw-Vaudran, 2014). 
The focus on economic and high political interests (and the South African public 
focus on erratic emotive cases) means that the traditional sources of public 
diplomacy - such as the promotion and interaction of one another’s cultures, tradition 
and values - are absent. It is such concerns over the gap between formal and trans-
societal links that have motivated a heightened government response in order to – in 
the words of a South African official – remove the ‘venom ... between the two 
societies’.19 One such initiative is the ‘South Africa Year in China’ in 2014 and ‘China 
Year in South Africa’ in 2015, a set of cultural events designed to strengthen bilateral 
relations and foster multi-sectoral cooperation (Wu, 2015).  
Another element is China’s engagement in the South African context through the 
Chinese diaspora. There are various local South African Chinese associations that 
have become unofficial interlocutors between Beijing and the broader South African 
society, such as the Chinese Association which co-ordinates cultural events like the 
Chinese New Year celebrations (Milo, 2013; Pon, 2014).  
There are nonetheless limitations in the extent to which the Chinese diaspora can 
help leverage closer relations. The Chinese community in South Africa is complex, 
consisting of various ethnic Chinese groups who have entered the country under 
different conditions; they also share very diverse origins and different levels of 
political, economic and social assimilation (Alden and Wu, 2014, p.27; Park, 2012). 
These distinctions are exacerbated by the varying levels of perceived ‘closeness’ to 
the Chinese state and interest in developing greater China–South Africa relations. 
The diversity within the Chinese community reinforces the divided views on what 
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being ‘Chinese’ means, highlights the complex dynamics between members of the 
diaspora and local people, and even the disjuncture’s that exist within diaspora 
communities themselves. The public reaction to a Constitutional Court ruling that 
allowed Chinese South Africans to become eligible under the BEE programme, 
which misconstrued the small numbers potentially involved (under 10 000) to being a 
concession and even incentive to all Chinese entering the country, underscores the 
sensitive domestic dynamics at play (Chang, 2008). 
Linked to this case is the factor of South Africa’s own internal politics. In particular is 
the public perception of government transactions as being non-transparent and 
driven by elite interests, which could also impact China-South Africa relations. 
Indeed the publicity surrounding the activities of a small number of individuals and 
their commercially minded interaction with top South African officials is not unique to 
China-South Africa relations. In 2013 several South Africa media reports pointed to 
the Gupta family’s close-knit ties with the ANC leadership and their use of an official 
military airbase to fly in wedding guests from India in a private jet. (Tripathi, 2013; 
Hlongwane, 2013). Accusations of the alleged demand for South African diplomatic 
passports for Gupta family members and government spending on advertisements in 
the Gupta-owned newspaper, the New Age, as well as the paper’s ‘business 
breakfast briefings,’ highlighted the symbiotic nature of the relationship (Ngalwa, 
Matlala and Shoba, 2013).  
Similar questions were raised over the purchase of Independent News and Media, 
formerly owned by the Irish Independent group, by the Sekunjalo Independent Media 
consortium. Described as a ‘private and commercial transaction’, there was a 
reported 25% ownership by the ruling ANC and 20% by ‘Chinese state instruments’, 
sparking concern over possible implications for the media environment.20 In 
particular, it led to suspicion over the governments’ interests in acquiring shares in a 
private media company and the nature of the deal. The concern over the Sekunjalo 
Consortium’s buying into one of the four largest media companies in South Africa is 
rooted in deeper socio-historical fears. Indeed, South Africans’ experience of 
censorship under apartheid makes any suggestion of the violation of the right to 
freedom of expression a highly emotive issue (Lloyd, 2013). 
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More recently in 2015 there has been public debate over the introduction of 
Mandarin in South African schools. Such discussions have centred around, on the 
one hand, the need for South Africans to learn Mandarin, which is becoming an 
important medium in a globally connected world; and, on the other, a more inward-
looking perspective commenting on the asymmetry of bilateral relations and the 
lesser degree of attention paid by government to preserving South Africa’s 11 official 
languages in education (Times Live, 2015; Nkosi, 2015; Vlok, 2015, pp.106-107). 
The tensions between these perspectives reflect on South African identity in a 
transforming international order, on the one hand actively globalising in step with the 
world’s leading emerging power or on the other hand focusing on a more narrowly 
preservationist and culturally defensive approach.  
Conclusion 
Geldenhuys (2012, p.30) states that understanding a country’s foreign policy and 
external conduct requires the consideration of a range of domestic factors such as: 
national attributes, government orientations and national experiences. It is the points 
and variety of intersects between China-South Africa, informed by such domestic 
factors that make this a uniquely complex strategic partnership.   
As demonstrated through this examination of South Africa’s relationship with China, 
the actual (as opposed to rhetorical) deepening of diplomatic and economic ties with 
Beijing followed upon a period of sustained foreign policy activism in continental and 
global affairs led by the Mbeki administration that barely factored China in. With the 
conscious assertion of an agenda under the Zuma government that sought to 
instrumentalise foreign policy for domestic development purposes, coupled to the 
global financial crisis and its impact on the traditional Western partners, the time was 
ripe for a stronger embrace of China. Re-aligning South African foreign policy to 
cooperate more closely with Chinese interests became a manifestation of its 
development needs and provided a source of legitimacy, which strengthens its 
leadership credentials as ‘Africa’s representative’. There remains public recognition 
that ‘the two countries would continue to regard bilateral relations as a strategic 
focus and priority in their respective foreign policies, as expressed in the 2014 ‘5-10 
Year Strategic Programme on Cooperation’ (South Africa and China, 2015). A 
‘normalising’ Chinese economy that moves away from manufacturing opens relations 
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to a deepening development partnership at official levels underwritten by substantive 
Chinese engagement beyond trade. 
However, in keeping with the scholarly assertion that elite positions on foreign policy 
and identity are often contested by domestic elements – be they counter-elites or 
societal groupings – there is criticism of these developments by ANC dissidents, 
opposition parties, as well as some elements of business and civil society – whose 
perspectives and interests converge to a position that is generally at odds with the 
Zuma administration’s foreign policy orientation towards China. This is reinforced by 
the dismay in South African and influential Western circles with the drift away from 
what they characterise as an explicitly value-laden foreign policy under Mandela.  
What these critical societal and foreign voices tend to neglect is that the post-
apartheid foreign policy vision is one which both trumpets a principle – human rights 
– while concurrently affirming an identity that is African and of the South (Mandela 
1993). In many respects the re-alignment of South African foreign policy is 
anticipated in a reading of Mandela’s formative article on post-apartheid foreign 
policy in late 1993 and its call for an embrace of the imperatives of domestic 
development, the African continent and the South itself (Mandela, 1993). Seen from 
this perspective, the Zuma administration’s focus on African leadership through 
leveraging Chinese power should be understood as an elite-led effort to reframe 
national identity towards this vision of post-apartheid identity through foreign policy 
activism. Under the Zuma presidency, principles like human rights are subsumed 
through foreign policy discourses on ‘Ubuntu’ and given a much more collectivist 
meaning that consciously draws on African values (DIRCO, 2011). Chinese 
endorsement of South Africa’s leadership role in Africa and the resources it can bring 
to bear to realise the government’s development ambitions. 
Forging national identity such that it reflects the African and Southern sensibilities is 
a foreign policy task as much as it is a domestic one. The alarm with which the 
government met the outbreak of xenophobic violence across the country starting in 
April 2015 seems to underscore the elite character of this aim and the dissenting 
views held by elements of South African society. That the government’s 
contemporary efforts to realise this re-orientation through foreign policy re-alignment, 
and the controversy it generates at home (and abroad), presses home the continuing 
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This article is partially based on earlier work by the authors published as ‘South 
Africa and China – the making of a partnership’, SAIIA Occasional Paper, South 
African Institute of international Affairs: Johannesburg, August 2014. 
 
Notes  
1. Examples, including various Zapiro cartoons during South Africa’s joining of the 
BRICS grouping and hosting of the BRICS Summit in 2013.  
2. For the full text of the Pretoria Declaration see 
www.peopledaily.comen/english/200004/25/3ng20000425_39697.html, accessed 
17 May 2014. 
3. For the full text of former President of the People's Republic of China Hu Jintao’s 
speech, see: ‘Enhance China - Africa Unity and Cooperation To Build a 
Harmonious World’, Speech at University of Pretoria, South Africa, 7 February 
2007, http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2007/jintao0207.htm, accessed on 
26 September 2013.  
4. One factor was the new trade rules that were negotiated at the WTO in 2005, 
which opened up many African textile sectors to market forces, see: Mutume, G. 
‘Loss of textile market costs African jobs’, April 2006, 
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2006/loss-textile-market-costs-
african-jobs, accessed 30 June 2014. Another example is the alleged dumping of 
coated paper originating in China and Republic of Korea, see: International Trade 
Administration Commission of South Africa.‘ Investigation into the alleged 
dumping of coated paper originating in or imported from the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea: Preliminary determination’, 445, 20 
August 2013.  
5. As expressed by a DIRCO official at the South Africa–China: Diplomatic 
Relations at 15 Years Ambassadorial Forum, 19 September 2013. 
6. Anonymous source. The training involved practice for landing on aircraft carriers, 
which the South African’s had learned from sub-contracted work with US forces 
during the Iraq war. The US government allegedly tried to block parts for flight 
training equipment upon learning of the scheme. 
7. Anonymous source suggested that President Jacob Zuma and SACP head, 
Gwede Mantashe had to exert pressure on NEC members to attend.  
8. See 2011 Sanya Declaration, 2012 Delhi Declaration, 2013 Durban Declaration, 
2014 Fortaleza Declaration and 2015 Ufa Declaration. 
9. CCP delegation visit to SAIIA in February 2013.  
10. As expressed by a DIRCO official at the South Africa–China: Diplomatic 
Relations at 15 Years Ambassadorial Forum, 19 September 2013.  
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11. Notably, analysts from China provide alternative figures based on Chinese 
estimates that are much higher, suggesting that China’s FDI stock in South Africa 
has moved from $44 million in 2003 to over $4 billion in 2011. Yet a more recent 
media report states that China’s total capital investment between 2003-2014 was 
of R13.33bn (see: Ensor, L. 2014, March 12. ‘Bilateral trade with China on the 
increase’, Business Day, retrieved from: 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2014/03/12/bilateral-trade-with-china-on-
the-increase). Statistical anomalies like these are a continuing source of 
contention at ministerial level.   
12. In a reflection of the Chinese response to changing mining regulations and BEE 
requirements for example, East Asian Metals, a subsidiary of Sinosteel, 
purchased a 60% share of ASA Metals in the Dilokong Mine in Limpopo (itself a 
joint venture with Limpopo province arranged in 1997); for more examples see 
Alden C and Y, Wu pp.18-22.  
13. This is seen in the expansion of Hisense and the FAW automotive manufacturing 
plants Heraldlive, ‘Chinese unveil plan for R18bn Coega investment’, 18 March 
2014, www.heraldlive.co.za/chinese-unveil-plan-for-r18bn-coega-investment/, 
accessed 22 June 2014. 
14. Observation made by M Qobo, participant in the SAIIA-Heinrich Böll Foundation 
(HBF) event, ‘China–South Africa: Unpacking a Strategic Partnership’, SAIIA, 
November 2012, http://www.saiia.org.za/events/china-south-africa-unpacking-a-
strategic-partnership.  
15. Also remarked by South African policymakers. Such as: Republic of South Africa. 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation Deputy Minister Marius 
Fransman, at the ‘China–South Africa Diplomatic Relations at 15 Years: 
Pretoria’s View’, keynote address at South Africa–China: Diplomatic Relations at 
15 Years Ambassadorial Forum, 19 September 2013, 
http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2013/frans0919.html, accessed 3 
October 2013 and Deputy Minister of Public Works Jeremy Cronin, remarks at 
the National Day of the People’s Republic of China, 27 September 2013, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2013/chin0930.html, 5 November 2013 
16. Numerous conversations with DTI officials. 
17. For other examples on public perceptions on China–South Africa, see Wu Y. 
2013, March 1. ‘The political and diplomatic implications of social media: The 
cases of China and South Africa’, African East-Asian Affairs (The China Monitor), 
pp. 70–87.  
18. As noted by Tony Twine (senior economist at Econometrix) in Campbell K, ‘Some 
challenges ahead as SA's new “partnership” with China takes shape’, 
Engineering News, 5 November 2010, 
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/some-challenges-ahead-as-sas-new-
partnership-with-china-takes-shape-2010-11-05, accessed 30 January 2011.  
19. Remark made by a South African official at the South Africa–China Diplomatic 
Relations at 15 Years Ambassadorial Forum, hosted by AISA, DIRCO and the 
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Pretoria, 19 September 2013.  
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enters-south-africas-media-space, accessed 1 July 2013; and Trewhela P, 
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